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WHY DO PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO CONTROL
VARIABILITY IN GENERAL DAMAGES (GENERALLY)
FALL ON DEAF EARS? (AND WHY THIS IS TOO BAD)
Joseph Sanders*
INTRODUCTION
What is wrong with American tort law? According to many, almost
everything. Unfortunately, many feel the system is not in good health,
yet the diagnoses of what ails it vary widely, as do the prescriptions for
treatment. The legal and cultural wars that have surrounded tort re-
form for the last thirty years have so polarized debate that it is diffi-
cult to find much common ground. Even within the academic
community it is difficult to find anything approaching a consensus
about ways in which we might improve the system. Interestingly
enough, there is one area where this is not entirely true and it is the
topic of this Article: general damages.1
To be sure, however, there is still plenty of disagreement. 2 Over the
years, a few scholars have called for the complete abolition of general
* Joseph Sanders is A.A. White Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center.
1. In this paper, I adopt the common understanding of this term. General damages are those
damages designed to compensate the plaintiff for pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and
similar hedonistic damages. They do not include those special damages that are (at least in
theory) capable of measurement such as lost wages, medical bills, and the like. For this paper, I
am not interested in drawing a bright line between general and special damages or distinguishing
among the types of general damages. Thus, I use the terms "noneconomic damages," "general
damages," and "pain and suffering damages" interchangeably, although some would argue that
the latter term is only a subset of the first two.
2. Almost all scholars recognize that jury general damage awards are one of the issues that
have driven tort reform efforts. See Kenneth S. Abraham et al., Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injury: Further Reflections, 30 SAN DiEGO L. REV. 333, 343 (1993); Robert MacCoun,
Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137, 156 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) ("The size,
equitability, and predictability of civil damage awards appear to be the most salient issues in the
civil-jury debate."); Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J.
56, 75 (1993) ("Compensation for pain and suffering becomes a focal point [in today's tort re-
form debate], because it is claimed that allowing it gives juries too much discretion to implement
their sympathies with injured plaintiffs at the expense of (what the defense advocates fear that
jurors perceive as) corporate deep pockets."); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1241
(1992) ("Damage awards by juries have long been a central issue in considerations of the tort
litigation system.").
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damages. 3 Even supporters recognize that the case for general dam-
ages is an uneasy one. 4 The relationship between such damages and
the overarching goals of tort law (compensation, deterrence, and cor-
rective justice) is somewhat tenuous.5 Justifications, such as they are,
are often based on practical considerations such as the frequent obser-
vation that pain and suffering damages provide a fund of money with
which to pay the plaintiff's lawyer's contingency fees without depriv-
ing the plaintiff of funds sufficient to actually pay medical bills or re-
place lost earnings. 6  Moreover, awarding money for pain and
suffering leaves the legal system open to the criticism that it is mone-
tizing something upon which a dollar value cannot be placed and,
therefore, violating our well-found sense of incommensurability. 7
Regardless of one's position on these issues, nearly everyone agrees
that one problem with general damages is that because there is no
market for pain and suffering, juries have a difficult time determining
the appropriate award. As a result, general damage awards exhibit
substantial variability. Moreover, the absence of a market makes it
difficult to justify or to criticize any given award.8
With respect to this issue, I feel I should begin with a confession. I
have always tread lightly over the topic of general damages when
teaching tort law, primarily because I had very little to say. When I do
address the topic it is generally to confuse first-year students by using
cases that drive home the point that there are few, if any, guidelines
concerning the reasonable size of general damage awards. For exam-
ple, I often teach Green v. Bittner,9 a 1980 New Jersey case involving
the wrongful death of an eighteen-year-old high school student, de-
scribed by the court as "a young woman of average intelligence and
cheerful disposition; hard-working and conscientious both at home
and at school; level-headed and dependable. As her counsel aptly
stated in summation, she was 'everybody's daughter,' not just meaning
3. See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of
Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163 (2004); Clarence Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 476 (1959).
4. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 56-58 (1991).
5. See Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 763 (1995).
6. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 399 (2d ed. 1993); Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on
Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Inju-
ries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773, 801 (1995).
7. See Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785 (1990); Ellen S. Pryor,
Rehabilitating Tort Compensation, 91 GEO. L.J. 659 (2003); Radin, supra note 2.
8. See Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of Our
Tort System, 90 VA. L REV. 1401 (2004).
9. 424 A.2d 210 (N.J. 1980).
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normal, but what everybody would want a daughter to be." 10 Under
the New Jersey wrongful death statute in place at the time, benefi-
ciaries were entitled to recover only for "pecuniary injuries resulting
from [the] death.""1 These damages included the loss of the value of a
child's anticipated help with household chores or the loss of direct
financial contributions by the child after the child becomes a wage
earner.12 Given these instructions, the jury in the Green case appar-
ently found that the parents had suffered no pecuniary loss, for they
awarded no damages whatsoever. 13
Both my students and the New Jersey Supreme Court find this to be
an intolerable outcome. But many students begrudgingly agree that
the jury may have gotten it right in the sense that if Ms. Green were
heading for college the following year, the award of zero dollars for
pecuniary damages may be correct. The conversation then turns to
the real problem, which, according to most students, is that New
Jersey did not allow parents to recover general damages (usually dis-
cussed in terms of mental anguish, grief, and loss of society and com-
panionship) for the loss of their child. 14 All is well until we begin to
discuss exactly how much money would compensate the parents for
this loss, and as any torts professor knows, the answers from the class
are all over the map.15 Without some type of anchor, judgments vary
widely. 16
Disagreements about the appropriate size of general damage
awards occur in the courts as well as in the classroom. To take but one
recent example, in Philip Morris v. French,17 the plaintiff, TWA flight
attendant Lynn French, sued several tobacco companies for her sinusi-
tis allegedly caused by breathing secondhand smoke on the job.1 8 The
jury found for the plaintiff and awarded her a total of two million
10. Id. at 211.
11. Id. at 212 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-5).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The jury instructions typically enumerate these elements of general damages. See, e.g.,
Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Tex. 1986).
15. The problem of compensation for the wrongful death of a teenager is a recurring one.
While I researched this article, a Texas jury in the case of Garcia v. Ford Motor Company, 33
Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 299 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005), awarded the
mothers of two teenage daughters killed in a car accident fifteen million dollars each in "actual
damages," a term of art that includes both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss. Undoubtedly, most
of this sum is general damages for the grief, mental distress, and loss of consortium suffered by
the parents. Id.
16. Anchoring is discussed infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
17. 897 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
18. Id. at 485. The plaintiff's lawsuit was facilitated by an earlier class action settlement be-
tween flight attendants and the tobacco industry which, inter alia, shifted the burden on the
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dollars for past pain and suffering and $3.5 million for future pain and
suffering. 19 The trial judge granted the defendant's motion for a re-
mittitur and reduced the award to $500,000 after concluding the award
was driven in part by prejudice against the tobacco companies that in
turn was fueled by comments from plaintiff's counsel.20 Here, as in
my classroom examples, differences of an order of magnitude separate
judgments about the proper level of general damages compensation. 21
My confession is that with my Green example or other examples
such as the one presented in the French case, I rarely carry the discus-
sion beyond the obvious points that the law offers only vague and
imprecise guidelines as to the appropriate size of the award, that
factfinders frequently disagree about the appropriate size of general
damages, and that factors such as anchoring or normative arguments
about the evil nature of the defendant (or the plaintiff) may alter
damage awards in the client's favor.22 Others have done much better.
They offer concrete proposals on how to improve the situation. In
causal question of whether secondhand smoke caused the plaintiff's injury to the defendant. See
Ramos v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc, 743 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
19. French, 897 So. 2d at 487.
20. Id.
21. Similar outcomes in other cases are reported in WEILER, supra note 4, at 55 n.39. In each
of the cases cited by Weiler, the trial or appellate court reduced the original jury awards. In one
case, a jury award of twenty-five million dollars for the distress of a mother who witnessed her
children killed in a traffic accident was reduced to $2.5 million. Id. As Weiler notes, "Even
when a judge decides to intervene, his point of departure is the base established by the jury's
original award, so any reduction he imposes will appear moderate only by comparison." Id. at 55
(internal citations omitted).
22. Much the same point is made by Dan Dobbs in his torts treatise:
Awards for pain are not easy to evaluate because there is no objective criterion for
judgment. For the same reason, it is difficult to set rational limitations on awards. The
claim of pain is therefore a serious threat to the defendants since, lacking any highly
objective components, it permits juries to roam through their biases in setting an award.
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1051 (2000).
Jurors recognize the difficulty of the task. They report that determining damages is more
difficult than deciding liability. They find very little guidance in the law on how they are to
compute damages. See Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions
of Citizens Who Serve as Jurors, in VERDICt, supra note 2, at 282, 297.
In a jury simulation, author Neil Vidmar notes that mock jurors
uniformly commented on the difficulty of putting a price on pain and suffering and
used different methods of calculating the awards. Some roughly split the difference
between the defendant's and the plaintiff's suggested figures. One juror doubled what
the defendant said was fair, and another said it should be three times medical ex-
penses .... A number of jurors assessed pain and suffering on a per month basis ....
Other jurors indicated that they just came up with a figure that they thought was fair.
Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and
Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 254-55 (1993) [hereinafter Vidmar,
Empirical Evidence] (internal citations omitted).
Author Edith Greene interviewed jurors who in 1984 decided a products liability case and
reports that they used a process of "guesstimation" to determine pain and suffering damages.
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this paper, I discuss these proposals and why they have met with so
little success.
In Part II of this paper, I summarize the empirical research on gen-
eral damage awards. In Part III, I review a number of proposals de-
signed to lessen variance and create greater horizontal equity. In Part
IV, I discuss why I believe these proposals have met with so little suc-
cess and in Part V, I suggest why this is unfortunate.
II. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON GENERAL DAMAGES
There is significant and sometimes innovative literature focusing on
the nature and extent of uncertainty with respect to general damage
awards. Key findings with respect to uncertainty follow certain
themes. The severity of the injury suffered by the plaintiff is a reason-
ably good predictor of the level of damages in general, and pain and
suffering in particular. For example, analyses of jury awards in per-
sonal injury cases in Florida and Kansas City from the mid-1970s to
late 1980s indicate that injury severity (as measured on a nine point
ordinal scale) is the best available predictor of overall damage awards,
explaining approximately forty percent of the variation in overall
awards. 23 All objective variables available to the authors explain ap-
proximately sixty percent of the variation in awards.24 They explain a
slightly less percentage of the noneconomic awards.25 Within each
category of damages, pain and suffering awards exhibit considerable
variance. For example, for the category "permanent significant"-cat-
egory six on the nine point scale, a category that includes injuries such
Edith Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process of Decisionmaking, 52 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 225, 230 (1989).
Lawyers routinely resolve the question of general damages in settlement by making them
some multiple of special damages. See JEFFREY O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No-
FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 51 (1975); H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETrLED OUT
OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 107-08 (1970) (stating
that multiple is an "arbitrary coefficient-typically from two to five, depending on the practice
of the area"); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in
Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 894
(1993) ("Judges and attorneys in North Carolina frequently speak of an informal guideline that
suggests that noneconomic damages should be between three and seven times the amount of
economic damages."). With respect to this practice, author Mark Geistfeld notes:
As there is no reason why actual pain-and-suffering injuries should be related to some
multiple of the plaintiff's economic loss, the practice appears to be a bargaining con-
vention that is acceptable to all parties concerned because it ameliorates the uncer-
tainty that each party would face if a jury were to determine the award.
Geistfeld, supra note 6, at 787.
23. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffer-
ing," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 923, 941 n.156 (1989).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 923, 941 n.156.
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as loss of a limb, one eye, kidney, lung, or hearing-the mean pain
and suffering award was $386,000 (in 1987 dollars). 26 The award at
the twenty-fifth percentile was $9,000 while the award at the seventy-
fifth percentile was $598,000.27 Other studies have produced similar
results. 28
In one study, David Leebron examined jury and trial judge awards
for pain and suffering in cases where the plaintiff died prior to trial. 29
He reviewed 256 reported appellate opinions where general damages
were awarded, admittedly a very selective sample. For each case,
Leebron knew the length of time each individual lived after the injury.
Except for very short survival times (less than half a minute) and rela-
tively longer times (more than a week), duration is not significantly
related to the size of the award. 30 Even within duration intervals,
there is a substantial variation in awards. For example, in a particu-
larly useful analysis, Leebron compared awards of drowning victims
who, as a group, suffer a similar fate for a similar duration of time.
Awards in these cases varied from nothing to over $137,000, with the
average being $32,000 and a standard deviation of $36,000 (in 1987
dollars). After appellate review, the awards ranged from $4,360 to
$52,800.31
An interesting question is whether other factfinders would provide
more consistent awards than jurors. Research by Neil Vidmar and
Jeffrey Rice indicates that arbitrators and jurors make comparable
judgments in terms of their mean and median awards.32 Individual
juror awards exhibit more variance. 33 Another study by Roselle Wiss-
26. Id. at 921, 936 tbl.3.
27. Id. at 937.
28. See, e.g., Mark A. Peterson, Compensation of Injuries: Civil Jury Verdicts in Cook County
(Rand Corp., Inst. for Civil Justice No. R-3011-ICJ, 1984); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh,
Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & Soc'e REV.
997 (1990); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compensa-
tion or Capricious Awards?, 8 INr'L REV. L. & ECON. 203 (1988); Roselle L. Wissler et al.,
Explaining "Pain and Suffering" Awards: The Role of Injury Characteristics and Fault Attribu-
tions, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 181 (1997).
29. David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 256 (1989).
30. Id. at 294.
31. Id. at 297. Other research has also found considerable "horizontal" variance in jury
awards. See Audrey Chin & Mark A. Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets: Who Wins in
Cook County Jury Trials (Rand Corp., Inst. for Civil Justice No. R-3249-ICJ, 1985); Sloan &
Hsieh, supra note 28, at 1026 ("In several respects, payment patterns appear to be inequitable
horizontally, but each finding has a possible contrary explanation."); Mark I. Taragin et al., The
Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 781 (1992).
32. Vidmar & Rice, supra note 22, at 893.
33. Id.
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ler, Allen Hart, and Michael Saks also compares juror awards with
those of legal professionals-judges and lawyers. 34 This study adopts
a two-step approach. First it asks the subjects to rate the severity of
injuries described in vignettes. The groups were remarkably similar in
their assessment of both severity and the factors that lead to this as-
sessment.35 Jurors, however, were less able than the other groups to
translate this assessment into actual damage awards. The authors' fi-
nal regression model used to predict awards was able to explain fifty-
eight percent of the variance for defense lawyers, forty-eight percent
for plaintiff lawyers, forty-two percent for judges, but only twenty-
three percent for jurors.36 As the authors noted, "these patterns of
predictability and intra-injury variability in awards are not surprising,
given that jurors have essentially no experience assigning a dollar
value to injuries while the other groups do."'37
Both the Vidmar and Rice, and the Wissler, Hart, and Saks articles
point out that these studies assess the judgments of jurors, not juries,
and that studies comparing juror and jury awards indicate less vari-
ance between deliberating jurors.38 Both studies create artificial, "sta-
tistical" juries from their data and compare them with the individual
awards of legal professionals. In doing so, the variance of the "jury"
awards is less than the awards of the professionals. 39
These results suggest that neither juries nor other legal actors have
agreed upon criteria for assessing general damages for a given level of
injury. The research also indicates that decisionmakers are likely to
be influenced by other factors such as the culpability of the plaintiff or
the defendant, or by initial anchoring points proposed by the parties
or by fellow jurors.
Indeed, most explanations of the variability we observe in general
damage awards place particular emphasis on how anchoring effects
influence decisionmaking.40 Whenever people are asked to make nu-
34. Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of Ju-
rors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1999).
35. Id. at 794.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources
of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 316 tbl.IV (1998).
39. See, e.g., Wissler et al., supra note 34, at 803. The degree to which such statistical juries
mimic real jury deliberation is an open question. See David Schkade et al., Deliberating About
Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1139, 1168 (2000).
40. Anchoring is not the only variable affecting general damage awards. For example, in Ed-
ward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards,
81 VA. L. REv. 1341 (1995), the authors provide a useful discussion on how the way in which the
general damages issue is presented to the jury (framing effects) alters judgments. Asking the
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merical estimates, initial values tend to "anchor" their final estimate
by changing the standard of reference that they use when making their
numerical judgment.41 Anchoring effects occur even when individuals
conclude that the anchor contains no useful information. Beginning
with the Chicago Jury Project in the 1950s, legal scholars have ob-
served anchoring effects in jury judgments on damages and have been
able to produce these effects in the laboratory.42
Given these findings, many scholars have offered specific proposals
on steps to take that may create greater certainty and predictability in
this area of tort law.43  The next section presents some leading
examples.
III. THE PROPOSALS
A. Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein
In a 1989 article, Randall Bovbjerg, Frank Sloan, and James Blum-
stein provided one of the most detailed sets of proposals on how to
jury to "make the plaintiff whole" is one such frame, which is different from a "selling price"
frame that asks the jury to imagine how much the plaintiff "would have to be paid to subject
herself to the injury in the first place." Id. at 1342.
41. The following discussion of anchoring is borrowed from Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 787-89 (2001).
42. See Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 756
(1959) (reporting that interviews conducted with jurors revealed that plaintiff's damage requests
anchored juror damage determinations in six of seven cases); Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H.
Bornstein, The More You Ask For, The More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 525-28, 532-33 (1996); Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl,
Assimilation to Anchors for Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED SoC. PSYCHOL.
991, 1009-10, 1016 (1995); John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects of
Requesting Different Damage Amounts in Personal Injury Trials, 129 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 491, 495
(1989); Allan Raitz et al., Determining Damages: The Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors'
Decision Making, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385, 390-94 (1990).
Some years, when I have the time, I divide my torts class in half and send the first half out of
the room while anchoring the other half by asking them if they think an (imaginary) jury's award
of X dollars in another wrongful death case where general damages are permitted is too much or
too little and then ask them to write down their own judgment as to the appropriate award in the
Green case. Then I repeat the process with the other half, but I provide this group with a differ-
ent anchor. Finally, the whole class has a discussion as to the proper amount. Invariably, the
anchors do affect average awards and, more importantly, the ability of many students to see the
justice in other awards that differ substantially from their own.
43. I do not mean to argue that everyone thinks that greater certainty in awards is itself a
good. My reading of the literature, however, causes me to believe that the great majority of
academics believe the present level of inconsistency is a bad thing. Among the reasons com-
monly given for this opinion are that the ad hoc and unpredictable nature of these awards argua-
bly threatens insurance systems, subverts the credibility of awards, and hinders the efficient
operation of tort law's deterrence function. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 23, at 908. Clearly, not
all scholars would agree with all of these reasons. For a useful discussion of the concept of
consistency, see John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REV. 59, 59-60 (1987).
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create greater consistency in general damage awards. 4 Their article
proposes three alternative frameworks that would constrain the oper-
ation of vague, open-ended legal rules and the discretion currently af-
forded legal factfinders.
The first alternative would create a matrix of values that would
award fixed damage amounts according to the severity of the injury,
the body part affected, and the age of the injured party. Under this
proposal, a fifty-four-cell matrix comprised of nine severity categories
and six age groupings would be filled in with relative values anchored
on the value of one hundred assigned to the death of a person sixty-
five years of age or older.4 5 The relative values would be based on
past jury findings in cases within each cell, aggregated across all case
types: medial malpractice, products liability, and so on.46 The actual
dollar amounts of awards might vary across jurisdictions and over
time.47 Factfinders would have no discretion in the size of the award
once they placed the plaintiff into appropriate age and injury catego-
ries.48 This is the most restrictive proposal of the three alternatives.
Similar, fixed amount proposals have been set forth by a few other
44. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffer-
ing," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989).
45. The authors justify the use of age and injury severity because these factors are objective
and are relatively good predictors of awards in aggregate studies. An interesting aspect of this
matrix is that awards are not linear with age. Id. at 944 tbl.5. Plaintiffs between the ages of fifty-
one and sixty-four are routinely awarded higher levels of noneconomic compensation than those
between thirty-five and fifty. Id. It is not obvious what psychological or emotional theories of
pain and suffering as a phenomenon would explain these results. If we are to judge by the
aggregate data, juries do not view pain and suffering as a phenomenon as a constant over time or
even as a harm that diminishes linearly over time.
Commenting on this aspect of the jury driven matrix, the authors suggest that prior to imple-
menting the matrix the legislature may wish to "tempe[r] [the values] in accordance with com-
mon sense notions of reasonableness [in order] to eliminate or moderate incongruities." Id. at
949.
46. In fact, as the authors note, case type influences noneconomic awards. Awards are higher
in medical malpractice cases and lower in automobile accident cases. Id. at 943 n.166. This, of
course, is another source of horizontal inequality in the award of noneconomic damages.
47. This scheduling proposal is critiqued by Peter H. Schuck, Scheduled Damages and Insur-
ance Contracts for Future Services: A Comment on Blumstein, Bovbjerg, and Sloan, 8 YALE J. ON
REG. 213 (1991). Schuck suggests a more modest reform that is closer to the Bovbjerg team's
second suggested reform scenarios: "[T]he jury might be informed about a range of previous
awards without being confined to that range, or it might be informed about a range but be
allowed to award outside that range as long as it gives reasons for doing so." Peter H. Schuck,
Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT, supra note 2, at 306, 326 [hereinafter Schuck,
Mapping the Debate].
48. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 946.
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scholars, 49 and other countries have adopted similar versions using
scales. 50
The authors recognized that this fixed value approach might be too
restrictive and therefore proposed one variation that would provide a
range of values within each cell, similar to what exists in federal sen-
tencing guidelines.51 They also suggested the possibility of a posttrial
administrative process for considering unusual cases.52 In order to
avoid too much variation at this stage, the authors proposed the crea-
tion of a single, statewide agency empowered to make such
adjustments. 53
The second reform proposed by Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein is
the introduction of valuation scenarios: "Instead of a numeric matrix,
• * * juries [might be given] a limited number of standardized injury
scenarios,' with associated dollar values of noneconomic loss for each
[scenario]. '54 Note that the scenarios are designed to assist only in the
awarding of noneconomic loss, not special damages. The authors pro-
posed up to ten scenarios that would be included as part of the jury
instructions. 55 Preferably, these scenarios would be in writing and the
jury could take them into their deliberations. The jury would be in-
structed that no single scenario is expected to fit their case perfectly,
but that the values presented in the scenarios are approved
benchmarks by which to assess the case before the jury.56
The key to this proposal, and many like it, is that it provides the jury
with potential anchors that actually reflect the "market rate" for these
injuries insofar as we can say that previous jury awards constitute a
market. As the authors noted, this approach reflects the normal
mental response of individuals to problems of valuation in their every-
day lives. For example, when buying or selling a house, one wants to
know the price of other, similar homes, realizing that no house is ex-
49. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice Liability, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES
AND POLICY 101, 122-23 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988); Marcus L. Plant,
Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200, 210-11 (1958) (suggesting that general
damages should be capped at fifty percent of the plaintiff's proven medical, nursing, and hospital
bills).
50. See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering Awards, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 399 (2005), for a discussion of a recently enacted provision in New South
Wales, Australia.
51. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 948.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 953.
55. Id. at 955 n.208.
56. A similar approach is suggested by WEILER, supra note 4. Weiler does not necessarily
oppose schedules, but he also advocates an intermediate solution in which "[a] number of stan-
dardized profiles [are] developed for cases deemed to be of intermediate severity .. " Id. at 61.
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actly like the house under consideration. The prices of the other
houses provide a set of benchmarks, or anchors, that are useful in de-
termining what the present house is approximately worth. This very
process resembles what trial and appellate court judges may do when
reviewing jury awards for excessiveness or inadequacy.5 7
The authors admitted that construction of the scenarios is a com-
plex matter. The scenarios must be detailed enough to be useful, but
without features that make the case truly unusual (for example, a con-
cert pianist suffering a severe wrist injury). The authors argued that
"[t]he most important factors to reflect in a scenario are the physical
severity of the injury, the victim's age or life expectancy, the extent of
pain endured, the extent of incapacity to engage in normal activities,
and the duration of each factor. '58
Surely Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein were correct in concluding
that jurors should receive no more than approximately ten scenarios.
Even ten scenarios may be too many. One suggestion is to have nine
stories reflecting the nine levels of injury, but a better suggestion is to
have a much larger inventory of scenarios and use a small number of
relevant ones in each case. There could, for example, be six or so
stories within a given injury category.5 9 The dollar values mentioned
in each story could be drawn from the same information used to cre-
ate the matrix values in the first proposal, and the set of stories could
provide a range of possible general damage values similar to the range
within each matrix cell suggested above.60
The third alternative proposed by Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein
would create a flexible set of upper and lower boundaries that reflect
the nature of the plaintiff's injury and that invalidate awards that are
above or below some threshold.61 The authors suggested placing lim-
57. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 954.
58. Id. The authors suggested that the scenarios should describe the circumstances of the
injury but should not include any information on responsibility or causation. Id. Obviously, the
authors are worried that jurors will allow the level of defendant culpability to influence the size
of general damage awards, something which formal tort rules forbid, but something that seems
to happen with a fair degree of frequency in actual cases. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S.
Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1990).
59. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 956.
60. Oscar Chase proposes a variation on this type of reform. Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors
Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, in CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN THE 1990s, at 339 (Larry
Kramer ed., 1996). Under Chase's proposal, jurors would be given a nonbinding chart summa-
rizing the range of awards (low, median, high) in cases of similar severity. In a special interro-
gatory they would be asked to categorize the level of injury within the frequently used one-to-
nine level scale and their general damage award in the case at hand. Id. at 349.
61. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 959.
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its that would invalidate only extreme outlier awards.62 They noted
that this proposal might achieve little more than occurs under normal
judicial review of awards for excessiveness or inadequacy. The very
existence of a published set of floors and ceilings, however, might em-
bolden judges to alter awards more frequently because they would
legitimate judicial intervention in the case of awards that fell outside
the prescribed range.
B. Wissler, Hart, and Saks
The research conducted by Wissler, Hart, and Saks is particularly
valuable not only because it offers suggested alternatives to present
practice, but also because it offers empirical data on how mock jurors
assess damages and then compares these awards to awards suggested
by judges and lawyers when each is presented with brief vignettes. 63
As noted above, these authors, like others, found substantial vertical
equity in the sense that people who are perceived to have suffered
more serious injuries receive larger awards on average than people
who are perceived to have suffered less serious injuries. 64 They also
reported substantial variance in awards within each scenario, how-
ever, and found that individual juror awards exhibited more variance
than those of legal professionals. 65 A key finding is that both jurors
and legal professionals generally agree about the severity of a given
injury, but there is less agreement about the dollar figure that should
be attached to an injury of a given severity:66
These findings suggest that commonly voiced speculations about the
inability or irrationality of jurors in evaluating injuries are miscon-
ceived ....
If there is any basis for concern, it is the translation from percep-
tions of injuries into dollar valuations. But that is a problem not
with jurors alone, but with the task-judges and lawyers similarly
display decreased predictability, albeit a smaller decrease, as they
move from severity assessment to damages valuation, and reveal
more between-group differences in the models that predict their de-
cisions. Thus, improvements, if justified as desirable policy, should
62. Id.
63. Roselle Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors,
Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MIcH. L. REV. 751 (1999).
64. Id. at 795. But see Corrine Cather et al., Plaintiff Injury and Defendant Reprehensibility:
Implications for Compensatory and Punitive Damage Awards, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189
(1996).
65. Wissler et al., supra note 63, at 794. The Wissler group also found that "[m]en and
wealthier jurors awarded more [damages] than women and poorer jurors." Id. at 806. These
demographic differences, however, accounted for relatively little of the variance in awards.
66. Id. at 804-06.
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be concerned less with who is to make the decisions about general
damages and more with making the task more achievable. 67
The primary impediment to achieving greater consistency is the
vague guidance jurors receive on what is to be compensated and a
complete absence of guidelines for how to translate this into dollar
awards. Moreover, some studies have shown that awards may be in-
fluenced by factors that as a matter of law should not play a role in
determining the size of the award. These factors include "concerns
about plaintiff's attorney fees, beliefs about the parties' insurance cov-
erage," and perceptions of the defendant's and the plaintiff's responsi-
bility for the incident.68 Jury instructions rarely inform jurors that
these factors should play no role in their general damages decision. 69
Because Wissler, Hart, and Saks's research suggests that jurors have
the most trouble converting perceptions of harm into dollar awards,
they conducted an experiment in which mock jurors were provided
information about the distribution of general damage awards in other
cases involving similar injuries. 70 In various conditions of their study,
Wissler, Hart, and Saks varied the nature of this information. Some-
times they provided information on the average amount awarded in
other cases, sometimes information on the lower and upper award
amounts within which eighty percent of awards fell, and sometimes
awards from four similar cases.71 All types of information did reduce
variability of awards when compared with a no-guidance condition.
Importantly, the information did not affect the size of awards.72 Al-
though Wissler, Hart, and Saks recognized the difficulty in placing
such information before the jury, they supported plans that "provide
jurors with descriptions of a range of injuries as a basis for forming a
reference scale against which to compare the case at bar. ' 73 The au-
thors also supported a plan that would "pool jury awards made for
similar injuries, and ... present these cases and their award distribu-
tions to juries for guidance in reaching their general damages awards
.... "74 The authors would also support increasing the size of juries
67. Id. at 812.
68. Roselle L. Wissler et al., Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 712, 714 (2000).
69. Id. The Wissler article includes a valuable discussion of the jury instructions on general
damages given in many states. Id. at 715-18.
70. Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
243, 244-46 (1997).
71. Wissler et al., supra note 68, at 719.
72. Saks et al., supra note 70, at 254.
73. Wissler et al., supra note 63, at 816.
74. Id. at 817 (internal citations omitted).
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(from six to eight or twelve) in order to increase stability and
predictability.75
C. Diamond, Saks, and Landsman
Another set of proposals that arise from a research project appear
in Diamond, Saks, and Landsman's article. 76 That experiment
presents a single stimulus to both six-person mock juries and individ-
ual jurors deciding the case alone.77 Like others before them, Dia-
mond, Saks, and Landsman reported significant variance in the
general damage awards, and neither attitudes about the tort system
nor background characteristics of jurors could explain the variation.78
Deliberating juries exhibited substantially less variance than individ-
ual jurors.7 9 Variance, however, remained high.80 As did Wissler,
Hart, and Saks, these researchers recommended returning to twelve-
person juries as a way to reduce variance. 81 They believed, however,
that this will have only a modest effect and that a substantial reduc-
tion in variance requires providing the jury with a set of reference
points against which they could assess the case at bar.82
In fact, in their study, Diamond, Saks, and Landsman manipulated
anchor points. One-fourth of their jurors heard plaintiffs ask for
$250,000.83 This produced significantly lower awards than those ar-
rived at by jurors who had no guidance.84 Among the alternative ways
of providing jurors with realistic anchors, the authors preferred the
idea of allowing attorneys, with some judicial oversight, to present to
the jury a set of pain and suffering awards that other juries made in
similar cases. 85 They envisioned a procedure similar to the use of
"comparables" in property tax appeals. 86
75. This assumes that decisions of larger groups exhibit less variance than those of smaller
groups. See Michael J. Saks, The Smaller the Jury, The Greater the Unpredictability, 79 JUDICA-
TURE 263 (1996); Michael J. Saks & Mollie Weighner Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of
Jury Size, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451, 463-64 (1997).
76. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources
of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 316 tbl.IV (1998).
77. Id. at 305.
78. Id. at 306-11.
79. Id. at 317.
80. See id. at 316 tbl.IV. The standard deviation of the award was 185% of the mean award
for nondeliberating individual jurors and 147% of the mean award for deliberating jurors. Id.
81. Diamond et al., supra note 76, at 317.
82. Id. at 317-22.
83. Id. at 318.
84. Diamond and her colleagues report that James Zuehl achieved similar results in an unpub-
lished study. Id. at 319.
85. Id. at 321-22.
86. Id. at 321.
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D. Baldus, MacQueen, and Woodworth
Baldus, MacQueen, and Woodworth offered a somewhat different
approach to controlling noneconomic awards that focuses on judicial
review and a more systematic use of the courts' additur and remittitur
powers. 87 They reviewed data suggesting that addititurs and remit-
titurs are relatively rare.8 8 Moreover, in most jurisdictions the use of
the additur or remittitur power relies on the court's intuition and nor-
mative judgment about the appropriate quantum of awards. In this
sense the judicial adjustment is as highly individualized as the initial
jury assessment. Even assuming that the adjustment is informed by
the judge's knowledge of jury awards in similar cases, this is rarely
discussed in opinions.
New York is apparently the only state that has a statute directing
the appellate division to "determine that an award is excessive or in-
adequate if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable com-
pensation"-judged in large part by awards in other similar cases. 89
This rule replaced the older, common-law "shock the conscience"
standard that still exists in many states. In determining if awards "de-
viate materially," New York courts look to awards approved in similar
cases. 90
Baldus, MacQueen, and Woodworth gave, by way of example, the
case of Martell v. Boardwalk Enterprises, Inc.91 The plaintiff lost his
arm in a boating accident and was awarded two million dollars in pain
and suffering. The appellate court reduced this award to $1.2 million
after comparing the facts of the case to eleven similar cases.92 As
summarized by the authors, the court engaged in a two-step analysis.
First, it compared the case to four other, serious permanent injury
New York cases and noted that although the general damages awards
87. David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Propo-
sal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Puni-
tive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109 (1994-95).
88. Id. at 1120 n.21.
89. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney 1995).
90. See Charles D. Cole, Jr., Charging the Jury on Damages in Personal-Injury Cases: How
New York Can Benefit From the English Practice, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1 (2004); Eva
Madison, The Supreme Court Sets New Standards of Review for Excessive Verdicts in Federal
Court in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 50 ARK. L. REV. 591, 595 (1997). In Gasperini
v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), the Supreme Court ruled that the New York
law is a substantive rule and therefore in diversity jurisdiction cases, federal district courts may
adjust jury verdicts without detriment to Seventh Amendment's reexamination clause. Not sur-
prisingly, a disproportionate share of reviews occur in New York. Neil Vidmar et al., Jury
Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 265, 288-90 (1998).
91. 748 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1984).
92. See Baldus et al., supra note 87, at 1136-37, for a summary of these cases.
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ranged from one to two million dollars, all involved much more seri-
ous injuries, such as paraplegia. 93 The court, therefore, concluded the
award was excessive.94 The second step was to determine the "cor-
rect" award, and here the court examined seven other cases involving
single limb amputations.95 The pain and suffering award in those
cases ranged from approximately $250,000 to $800,000.96 The court
then ordered a remittitur to $1.2 million.97 Interestingly, the court did
not explain why it chose this amount, which was fifty percent greater
than the largest single amputation award. 98
The Baldus, MacQueen, and Woodworth proposal builds on the
New York practice. They offered a similar, albeit somewhat more for-
mal, procedure in which the trial or appellate court would first iden-
tify the characteristics of the case that may properly affect the level of
damages, then identify groups of comparable cases, and finally con-
duct an analysis. Although the authors did not oppose a qualitative
judgment such as occurred in Martell, they argued that a set of quanti-
tative tools will produce a more objective, principled, and accurate
outcome. These tools include:
(1) An adjustment of past awards for inflation.
(2) The creation of a rank ordering of the case under review and a
set of comparison cases in terms of their overall level of general
damages. Comparison cases would be ranked on a five-point scale
from much less to much more severe than the case under review.99
(Doing so focuses one's attention on the cases, especially the ones
that are most similar in terms of factors that affect damage awards.
By this analysis, the awards in the four nearest neighbors in Martell
ranged from a low of just under $500,000 to just over one million
dollars, substantially less than the two million dollars actually
awarded by the jury.)
(3) An adjustment of the damages in each of the comparison cases
to reflect the award that would have been returned if the level of




97. Martell v. Boardwalk Enterprises, Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 744, 755 (2d. Cir. 1984). More accu-
rately, the court offered the plaintiff the choice of accepting this amount or in the alternative
retrying the damages issue. Id. In most jurisdictions, the court has no power to reduce a jury
judgment but it can order a new trial if it finds that the award is against the weight of the
evidence. As a practical matter, parties offered a remittitur nearly always choose this alternative
to a new trial.
98. Baldus et al., supra note 87, at 1138.
99. In an empirical part of this research project, the authors actually tested this method on a
sample of 461 cases involving serious injuries to children. Several individuals rated each case.
According to the authors, between-rater reliability indicates that the courts can conduct similar
analyses. Id. at 1145.
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harm in the comparison case had been the same as in the case under
review. The most serious comparison case gets a compensable harm
score of one hundred and each other case, including the case under
review gets a score that is some percentage of one hundred. Then
the actual awards in all cases are adjusted as if they had the same
compensable harm score as the case under review. At this point the
court can compare the actual award in the case under review with
the "adjusted" awards in other cases. (Again the authors undertook
this analysis for the Martell case and found that the highest award in
an "adjusted" comparison case was slightly under one million
dollars.)
(4) The creation of a range of reasonableness. Verdicts would only
be affirmed if they were no more than ten percent higher than the
highest award as measured by methods (2) and (3) above.
This is obviously a complex proposal, at least in its initial stages, and
as the authors noted, it is something judges, but not juries, might be
expected to do.' 00
E. Geistfeld
Mark Geistfeld began his paper with the observation that people
disagree as to whether general damage awards are too high.'0 ' His
goal was to have juries estimate the appropriate size of awards based
on the amount a person would pay to eliminate the risk that caused
100. Id. at 1143-53.
101. Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries De-
termine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773, 801 (1995). For example,
Geistfield compares Vidmar, Empirical Evidence, supra note 22, at 263 ("It is intriguing to ques-
tion why belief in the ... excessiveness of non-economic damages [is] so widespread and why
many authors and policymakers have failed to recognize the flimsy or contrary evidence .... "),
with W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODuCrs LIABILITY 100 (1991) ("[Tlhe absence of any well-
defined criteria for setting compensation levels has led many observers to speculate that there
has been an escalation of pain and suffering awards."). Geistfeld, supra, at 777 n.8.
If one uses other legal systems as a base rate, however, there can be little argument that
American damages (special and general) are high. As Professor Reimann notes:
A major reason why judgments in the rest of the world are so much lower than in the
United States is that most non-American courts will award only the pecuniary damages
clearly documented and add comparatively low sums for pain and suffering. There is,
as far as the national reports indicate, no jurisdiction outside of the United States
where a plaintiff can currently recover more than about $300,000 for non-pecuniary
damages, even in the most catastrophic cases. Courts in many countries also set awards
for pain and suffering according to unofficial schedules and thus stay within generally
accepted, and usually fairly low, limits.
Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century:
Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. CoMp. L. 751, 809 (2003) (internal citations
omitted). Reimann further notes that in Canada, the Supreme Court has established a maxi-
mum recovery of approximately $180,000 in 2001 U.S. currency. Id. at 809 n.300. The highest
known German award is in the range of U.S. $250,000. Id. In the Netherlands the highest re-
corded figure is U.S. $140,000 and in France approximately U.S. $300,000. Id.
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his or her injury.102 His analysis is generally restricted to products
liability cases where he argued that it is possible to obtain a rough
estimate of the probability of an injury of some kind.10 3 For example,
a jury would be told that the defendant's wrongdoing resulted in the
plaintiff being exposed to a one in 10,000 risk of injury. The jury
would then be asked how much the individual would pay to purchase
a safety device that would eliminate the one in 10,000 risk that the
individual would end up with a pain and suffering injury as severe as
the plaintiff's. After determining that amount, the jury is asked to
multiply it by 10,000 to come to a final award.10 4 Unfortunately, there
seems to be no empirical data on the values this approach would gen-
erate or on the between-case variability it would produce.
F. Summary of Proposals
The process of awarding general damages faces two fundamental
problems. First, there is no market against which to judge whether the
awards are too high or too low. Second, partly because there is no
market, we observe in practice substantial variation in awards even
between cases that present similar facts. Most of the proposals boot-
strap a solution to the first problem. They use past jury awards as the
market from which to construct a judgment about the appropriate size
of any given award. If we believe that the key problem with general
damages is one of outliers and unacceptable variation in awards, this
method offers a reasonable solution. This approach is not particularly
attractive, however, if we believe that jury awards are generally
skewed in one direction or the other. If, for example, we believe that
jury general damage awards in permanent serious injury cases such as
quadriplegia are, on average, insufficient, or that on average pain and
suffering awards in minor injury cases are too large, this method of
assessing the "correct" amount of damages simply replicates past er-
rors. Geistfield's alternative is to have juries assess damages from an
ex ante perspective, asking how much a reasonable person would have
paid to eliminate the risk that caused the pain and suffering injury. 105
What is unknown at this time is whether his solution would help at all
with respect to the variation problem.
All of the other proposals focus on reducing variance. Although
every proposal is somewhat unique, the suggested reforms can be or-
102. Id. at 804-05.
103. Id. at 806.
104. Geistfeld, supra note 101, at 842-43.
105. Id. at 779.
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ganized into a few general types. The most frequent suggestion would
change the way in which juries determine general damages.
Proposals directed at juries vary in the amount of discretion they
give jurors. The most restrictive proposals create a mandatory sched-
ule that would award a fixed amount of damages for each category of
plaintiff. The categories generally reflect the seriousness of the injury
and, perhaps, the age of the plaintiff. Other, less restrictive proposals
provide juries with a range of permissible awards for each category of
plaintiff, somewhat like sentencing guidelines albeit with far fewer
variables. Still less restrictive proposals provide such ranges but tell
jurors that they are only suggestions and permit awards outside the
suggested range. A variation on this idea is to provide juries with sev-
eral scenarios that are somewhat similar to the case under considera-
tion. Each scenario would contain a general damage award and
together the scenarios would provide the jury with a nonbinding range
of awards.
A second type of proposal builds on the judiciary's common-law
power to adjust inadequate or excessive awards either by ordering a
new trial on damages or through the right to alter the nature and
scope of judicial and appellate review of awards. Under these pro-
posed changes the judiciary would compare awards in one given case
to other awards in similar cases and would adjust verdicts that are
inadequate or excessive when compared to other verdicts.
The variations among these proposals should not obscure their fun-
damental similarities. Each suggests one or more ways of using aggre-
gate data to estimate the "proper" level of pain and suffering damages
in each case. Each then offers a method to convey this information to
decisionmakers. Finally, each recommends that the appropriate deci-
sionmaker be given more or less discretion in deviating from the
"proper" amount.
IV. WHY THESE PROPOSALS HAVE MET WITH So LITTLE
SUCCESS (IN NON-MASS-TORT SITUATIONS)
Except for the New York statute mentioned above, I know of no
state that has adopted any of these proposals. The response to these
various, sensible proposals addressing a widely recognized problem
has been silence. Why?
A. Horizontal Equity in Mass Torts
Part of the answer, strangely, may be that similar procedures have
been widely used in one very important corner of tort law. In the area
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of mass torts, procedures designed to produce greater horizontal eq-
uity are commonplace. If we set aside those mass torts that arise from
a single catastrophic event such as an airplane crash and the few medi-
cal device, drug, or toxic mass torts that have resulted in substantial
defense victories on the merits,10 6 a substantial percentage of other
mass torts result in defendant bankruptcy or mass settlement, often
through the use of a claims facility. 10 7 This small but highly visible
portion of the tort docket is resolved by using such procedures, which
systematically impose substantial horizontal equity when paying
claims.108 Horizontal equity was also an important consideration in
the resolution of claims under the statute established to compensate
victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington, D.C.109
Several factors militate toward placing greater emphasis on hori-
zontal equity in these cases. In ordinary litigation, the arguable injus-
tice of horizontal inequity is largely invisible. When two similarly
situated parties receive different general damage awards in separate
lawsuits, the plaintiff receiving the lesser amount is unlikely to even
know of this inequity. His or her lawyer has little incentive in making
a point about this unfortunate outcome that after all could be blamed,
at least in part, on the advocacy skills of counsel. Even if the lawyer
were to seek redress, achieving any relief by way of an additur or a
106. These include the Bendectin litigation and silicone implants, at least as they relate to
systemic injuries. See 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 396 (2002); MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECrIN AND BIRTH
DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS ToxIc SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996); JOSEPH SANDERS,
BENDECTIN ON TRIAL (1998).
107. See Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1361 (2005), for a discussion of the many claims resolution facilities and other mass tort
settlements since Dalkon Shield. See also Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Under-
standing Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961 (1993).
108. McGovern, supra note 107, at 1368.
109. See Stephan Landsman, A Chance To Be Heard: Thoughts About Schedules, Caps, and
Collateral Source Deductions in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 393 (2003). Landsman notes that concern for horizontal equity was strongest with respect
to noneconomic losses.
Despite a strikingly liberal standard for the calculation of noneconomic losses, the Spe-
cial Master decreed a flat and fixed presumed award for all those who died: "The pre-
sumed noneconomic losses for decedents shall be $250,000 plus an additional $50,000
for the spouse and each dependent of the deceased victim. Such presumed losses in-
clude a noneconomic component of replacement services loss." Claimants could seek
to prove "extraordinary circumstances" that might justify departure from this fixed
sum, but they were given no guidance or encouragement.
Id. at 402 (quoting September llth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233,
11,246 (Mar. 13, 2002)).
It is instructive to compare this result with the data presented by Leebron. See supra text
accompanying notes 29-31.
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new trial on damages is remarkably unlikely. And from the court's
point of view, the outcome may be rationalized as the result of some
unique facts and the inevitable give and take that occurs within the
black box of jury deliberations.
Many of the factors that render inequity invisible in ordinary litiga-
tion disappear in the mass tort, class action settlement context. In
these cases it is often far more difficult to argue that substantial sub-
stantive differences exist between the parties. Attorneys are much
more likely to object if their clients are treated differently from other,
similarly injured individuals. Moreover, judges, masters, or others in
charge of settlement processes or claims facilities are, inevitably,
pushed toward a bureaucratic justice model in which standards are set
by external bodies (not the jury), each case is evaluated in terms of
only a limited number of weighted factors, and the standards are
based, at least in part, on aggregative and averaging processes. 110 As
McGovern noted, in many settlement processes a number of variables,
generally between five and twenty, may be considered and applied to
individual cases by the use of an algorithm or formula.11' Within such
systems, horizontal equity, especially with respect to general damages,
becomes an important criterion of fairness.
The existence of now routine aggregation procedures in the mass-
tort context underscores the point that the tort system's general fail-
ure to adopt proposals such as those discussed above is not due to any
fundamental inability to implement such schemes. The explanation
for the failure to adopt such schemes lies elsewhere. In my judgment,
two factors seem most important: the relative superiority of damage
caps in achieving defendant objectives, and the organizational and
normative structure of the plaintiff's bar that causes the bar to treat
such proposals with little more than benign neglect.
B. Damage Caps
Suggestions on how we might improve the method of awarding gen-
eral damages in tort litigation are not being written on a blank slate.
Even the earliest of these proposals in the 1980s were being advanced
against the background of an alternative solution to uncertain general
damages-damage caps. In fact, some of the proposals are offered as
an alternative to damage caps as a way of controlling noneconomic
awards.112
110. See Baldus et al., supra note 87, at 1124-25. The authors borrow the term from JERRY L.
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983).
111. McGovern, supra note 107, at 1372.
112. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 956.
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Damage caps were first introduced as part of the initial round of
tort reform following the hard malpractice insurance market in the
late 1970s and early 1980s.113 By the late 1980s, when the Bovbjerg,
Sloan, and Blumstein article was published, many states had already
placed caps on noneconomic damages. 1 4 By 1987, twenty-three states
had caps ranging from a low of $150,000 to a high of one million dol-
lars. 1 5 Some states imposed caps only for certain types of cases (such
as malpractice), while others imposed caps for all injuries. In recent
years, states that avoided caps in earlier rounds of tort reform have
now instituted them, at least for some types of cases.' 16
The criticisms of caps are so well known that a mere listing will
suffice here. Caps generally come into play only in cases where the
plaintiff has suffered a very severe injury. They do not address the
problem of under-evaluation nor do they address the potential for
over-evaluation in cases where the plaintiff's injury is not serious.
Consequently, this kind of cap does not assist the jury at all in arriving
at an appropriate award for noneconomic damages. Even in serious
injury cases, caps that are not adjusted for inflation may, over time,
impose systematic under-evaluations for some severe, permanent inju-
ries. Caps may have another deleterious consequence for cases that
are very expensive to prepare and try. If a plaintiff's injuries, though
severe, do not result in large special damages, caps on general dam-
ages may limit recovery such that a case may not generate a suffi-
ciently large award to justify litigating the case.
113. The relationship between the tort system and hard insurance markets has been hotly
contested over the years. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVI-
DENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985); Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform:
Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004); George L. Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987); Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce,
"Off to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207
(1990); Schuck, Mapping the Debate, supra note 47.
114. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and
a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 499 (1989). Only rarely did states cap all
damages. Id. at 543. But see Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 536 (Va. 1989)
(upholding Virginia's $750,000 damage cap).
115. In a few states, the caps were struck down as unconstitutional. See Lucas v. United
States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. 1988).
116. For example, Texas instituted caps on noneconomic damages for medical malpractice
actions in 2003. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (Vernon 2005). Because an
earlier effort to impose caps was struck down by the Texas Supreme Court, the legislature
caused to be placed on the ballot a state Constitutional Amendment permitting caps in all tort
cases. The provision narrowly passed. See Michael W. Shore & Judy Shore, Personal Torts, 57
SMU L. REV. 1127, 1127 (2004). Washington passed a cap statute that caused the size of the
maximum award to vary with the life expectancy of the plaintiff (with a minimum of fifteen
years). Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 958 n.216. For a discussion of other states that have
recently instituted caps, see Finley, supra note 113.
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If caps are such a poor method for controlling jury variability, why
have they been the legislation of choice in many states?1 17 An impor-
tant consideration, of course, is that caps are a relatively straightfor-
ward reform that may be implemented with only minor changes to the
existing tort system. In this regard, caps have an inherent advantage
over many of the alternatives discussed above that require an ongoing
commitment to data collection concerning average awards in similar
cases.
Administrative convenience aside, the most frequently given justifi-
cation for caps is that they provide a way to control insurance costs.
Recall that the early rounds of caps came in the wake of and as a
response to the hard malpractice insurance market of the 1970s and
1980s. In this regard, there has been an ongoing debate regarding
whether caps actually accomplish this purpose. 18 Even if caps do not
have a substantial effect on rates, in combination with caps on puni-
tive damages, they substantially reduce the possibility of a truly large
award against a defendant. "Bet the company" scenarios are less
likely, at least in non-mass-tort situations. There is some evidence,
however, that caps do have real bite in more serious cases. 119
Defense interests have fought long and hard for caps on punitive
and general damages but seem to have expressed little interest in the
types of reform proposed in this article. Obviously, in each individual
case, defendants do care about potential horizontal inequality. Many
defendants and their insurers, however, are repeat players. 120 This is
especially likely among those defendants at the forefront of tort re-
form. For this group, uncertainty in a given case is not necessarily a
large problem because over their entire inventory of cases the average
award may approach mean awards. Although a reduction in the vari-
117. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 958 n.216.
118. See Richard E. Anderson, Effective Legal Reform and the Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 343 (2005); Finley, supra note 113; Donald J. Palmisano,
Health Care in Crisis: The Need For Medical Liability Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETHICS 371 (2005); Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice 'Crisis': Recent Trends and the
Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFF, Jan. 21, 2004, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
content/full/hlthaff.w4.20vl/DC1; Kathryn Zeiler, Turning From Damage Caps to Information
Disclosure: An Alternative to Tort Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 385 (2005).
119. See Vidmar, Empirical Evidence, supra note 22, at 294 (stating that twenty-four of 179
medical malpractice awards were adjusted downward because of caps on general damages); Al-
bert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical Malpractice Litiga-
tion in the South, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 199, 206-08 (2001) (arguing that caps decrease the
average relative recovery by medical malpractice claimants).
120. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 97 (1974).
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ance of general damage awards presumably is a desirable thing for
repeat defendants, it is understandable why this is not a high priority.
Thus, damage caps are an impediment to reforms designed to re-
duce variation not because they are a reasonable substitute for these
reforms, but because they are in some ways superior to these reforms
in achieving certain defense goals in the area of tort law. But if the
success of caps explains why defendants express little interest in gen-
eral damage reforms, why is there so little interest on the plaintiffs'
side as well?
C. The Organizational and Normative Structure of the
Plaintiffs' Bar
It is not surprising that the plaintiffs' personal injury bar has ac-
tively and continuously opposed general damage caps in state legisla-
tures.1 21 These efforts have met with some success primarily because
the courts in some states have declared caps to be unconstitutional
under state constitutions.12 2 These successes notwithstanding, the
general trend over the last twenty years or so has been one of defense
success in pushing through various tort reform proposals in many
states.
Given this overall trend, it is surprising that plaintiff lawyers rarely
seem to have taken anything but a reactive position on general dam-
ages reform. I do not know of any states in which the plaintiffs' bar
has supported the types of reform suggested here. Potential reasons
for this position are many, and unfortunately I know of no research
directly on point. It does seem plausible, however, that both the or-
ganization of the plaintiffs' bar and the norms of its members play a
part in this inaction.
As to organization, numerous studies indicate that similar to other
segments of the bar, the plaintiffs' bar is highly stratified. Within the
plaintiffs' bar, stratification is determined primarily by the value of the
cases a lawyer or a firm handles. 123 Stratification is itself highly corre-
lated with active participation in the politics of tort reform. It is the
121. Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary
Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiffs' Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 219,
237 (2001).
122. See, e.g., Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1081 (Ill. 1997).
123. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "It's Darwinism-Survival of the Fittest": How Mar-
kets and Reputations Shape the Ways in Which Plaintiffs' Lawyers Obtain Clients, 21 LAW &
POL'Y 377, 377-78 (1999). See also Sara Parikh, Professionalism and Its Discontents: A Study of
Social Networks in the Plaintiffs' Personal Injury Bar 36, 65 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Illinois, Chicago) (on file with author). According to Parikh, at least in Chi-
cago, the plaintiffs' personal injury bar lacks a well-delineated middle class as both low-end
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high-end section of the plaintiffs' bar that is politically active and that
makes most of the contributions to political and judicial campaigns. 124
This group of lawyers dominates the personal injury bar's legislative
strategy, and it is this group of lawyers who has the most to lose when
caps are imposed on general damages. 125 It is not surprising that they
focus the lion's share of their attention to defeating such proposals.
Status is not determined entirely by case values. Other components
of status include a willingness to try a case and trial advocacy skills. 126
For these skills to have significant value, however, they require a re-
gime where rhetorical ability can have a significant impact on case
outcomes. In a system where damages are largely determined by a set
of fixed rules, such skills can have little play.127 For highly skilled,
elite trial lawyers, schedules and similar devices restrict an important
aspect of what sets them apart from other personal injury lawyers. 128
To the extent that this is the case, it is not surprising that they have not
actively supported such reforms.
Nor is this simply an instrumental position. Most people who have
spent time with plaintiff personal injury lawyers are struck by their
defense of traditional, common-law adversarial processes.1 29 Thomas
Galligan offered a compelling review of the virtues of the common-
law tort action and its incompatibility with many of the proposals re-
viewed in this paper. 130 He explained that in ordinary litigation:
The specific story dominates the stage. The law's generalized stan-
dards accommodate the details of the case. Broad standards invite
particularistic, event specific versions of what happened. The de-
tailed story matters more than it might in a legal landscape of de-
tailed, particularistic rules. When the story matters, the individuals
practitioners and high-end firms poach the cases that would be the bread and butter of a middle
of the road practice. Id.
124. Parikh, supra note 123, at 104.
125. As Kritzer notes, most personal injury lawyers are working on automobile cases where
the primary limiting factor is another driver's insurance policy, and most such policies have dam-
age limits far below the caps imposed in most states. Kritzer, supra note 121, at 237.
126. Parikh, supra note 123, at 72.
127. See, e.g., Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensa-
tion in Japan, 24 LAW & Soc'". REV. 651 (1990) (discussing judicially imposed damage ranges in
Japan).
128. Kritzer notes that given the increasing hostility of jurors to plaintiffs, some form of
scheduling might in fact work in favor of clients in some cases. Kritzer, supra note 121, at 238.
For general discussions of prodefense perspectives among jurors, see Stephen Daniels & Joanne
Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 1225 (2004); Valerie P. Hans & Juliet
Dee, Whiplash: Who's to Blame?, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1093 (2003).
129. Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice In Tort Law, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1481, 1482 (1992).
130. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Tragedy in Torts, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 139, 172
(1996).
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matter. The litigants and those whom they call as witnesses become




Continuing on this theme, Galligan stated:
Turning to general damages, we see perhaps the most dramatic
example of tailoring damage awards to the needs of the particular
plaintiff. Juries rendering awards for mental anguish, pain and suf-
fering, and loss of enjoyment of life focus not on the average person
but once again, on the particular plaintiff .... Fact finders consider
the pain the particular plaintiff suffered, the mental anguish this
plaintiff has suffered, and the loss of enjoyment of life this plaintiff
has suffered. The jury focuses in on the particular plaintiff involved
in the particular case. It should be noted that recent proposals to
provide jurors with guidelines or schedules for general damages are
inconsistent with traditional rules concerning general damages. The
proposals would abstract away from the particular plaintiff.132
To the degree that lawyers are normatively committed to the individu-
alized justice model embedded in common-law processes, they are un-
likely to champion any proposals that are grounded on aggregative
limitations to individualistic justice.
V. AND WHY THIS Is Too BAD
Most of this Article has been directed at reviewing proposals to
ameliorate variance in general damage tort awards and discussing why
they have met with so little success. As the title of this article sug-
gests, I think that it is a bad thing. Here is why.
There are few more fundamental principles of justice than the prin-
ciple that like cases should be treated alike. It is not easy to justify
substantial horizontal inequity in any area of law. The problem, of
course, is determining which cases are alike. But in an area such as
general damages where there is no external standard as to the proper
size of any award, the burden is reasonably on those who would justify
different awards for similar injuries.
Proponents of current procedures may argue that across all cases
the level of inequality is not as large as outliers suggest, and that ex-
treme cases should not dominate our decisions. To some extent, the
point is well taken. Whether we wish it or not, however, the outliers
play a disproportionate role in the politics of torts. Newspaper arti-
cles inevitably focus on such cases, and the story they tell can rarely be
131. Id. at 140.
132. Id. at 172.
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overcome or explained. 133 The articles create a perception of unfair-
ness that undermines the legitimacy of tort.
One may take the position that if perceptions are wrong, or at least
substantially wrong, we should not allow them to affect existing meth-
ods of calculating general damages. It seems clear, however, that per-
ceptions of unfairness have caused most organized defendants to view
the tort system as a lottery that exposes them to unknown and per-
haps unknowable damages. It is easy to be cynical when listening to
professional advocates advance these arguments, but for anyone who
has listened to ordinary physicians discuss the medical malpractice
system it is difficult to conclude that their sense of injustice is anything
but heartfelt. To use Max Weber's categories, the reforms discussed in
this paper would increase the sense of formal rationality in a corner of
tort law now dominated by what can fairly be described as substantive
irrationality. 134
At a practical level, reforms might ease the pressure for further,
defense-oriented legislative change in the tort system. Some will ar-
gue, perhaps correctly, that it is too late. No proposed changes in the
calculation of damages will cause defense interests to cease their ef-
fort to alter the system to their advantage. This gaming, however, is
not inevitable. At this juncture, it is worth remembering the funda-
mental compromise that produced the modern worker's compensation
system. Defendants traded greater coverage-the effective end of the
contributory negligence and fellow servant rules-for greater cost cer-
tainty.135 We do not have to go all the way to a worker's compensa-
tion model to imagine tradeoffs of coverage for certainty that might
ameliorate the tort wars. But, the proposals to modify ways of calcu-
lating general damages discussed in this article are an important com-
ponent of any such compromise.
133. See generally Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the
Media as Your Guide, 80 JUDICATURE 64 (1996).
134. See David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 720.
135. Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Acci-
dents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 69 (1967).
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